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THE ASBESTOS TRAGEDY: LEGAL ISSUES AND
THE NEED FOR REFORM
I.

INTRODUCTION

On December 27, 1982, ABC News presented a program on nationwide television entitled "Asbestos: The Way to Dusty Death. '", The
program's appearance in prime time shows the increasing concern the
American public has demonstrated in an array of asbestos-related
problems. The concerns cut across the medical aspects of "the worst
industrial killer of all time"' and involve serious legal issues.4
The asbestos problem is complex. Touching individual families and
giant corporations alike, its ramifications have been far reaching. At
the center of the controversy is the threat that high exposure to asbestos apparently leads to illness and death.' On the periphery are the
questions of who is responsible for this medical tragedy and who should
pay for it.' The problems involving asbestos are of such magnitude that
there has been talk of federal legislation to deal with some of the issues." It appears there is a need for some type of action. Whatever the
future may bring, the problems related to asbestos are currently being
litigated in the nation's courts. The legal issues remain in a state of
uncertainty and commentators anxiously await new cases which seek to
resolve the tragic controversy.

II.

THE MEDICAL PROBLEM

Asbestos is "a fibrous, incombustible, magnesium and calcium silicate . . ." which has been primarily used for insulation. Although
once thought relatively safe, it is now considered to be dangerous.' For
1. Transcript of ABC News Closeup, Asbestos: The Way to Dusty Death, (Dec. 27, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as ABC News] (on file at University of Dayton Law Review).
2. See Hertzberg, Asbestos Lawsuits Spur War Among Insurers, with Billions at Stake,
Wall St. J., June 14, 1982, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as Hertzberg].
3. ABC News, supra note 1.
4. The legal questions involved are generally founded in the controversy of who is responsible for the health hazard and to what extent the responsible party must compensate for the damage caused.
5. Comment, Asbestos Litigation: The Dust Has Yet To Settle, 7 FORDHAM URa. L.J. 55
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Asbestos Litigation].
6. Certainly the asbestos industry and the insurance companies which insure them have
been the target of many lawsuits.
7. See Mehaffy, Asbestos-Related Lung Disease, 16 FORUM 341 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Mehaffy].
8. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 152 (25th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited
as DORLAND'S].

9.

Mehaffy, supra note 7, at 341.
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the thousands of shipyard employees, construction workers, and brake
mechanics who have been exposed to asbestos dust, the medical threat
is real and immediate." Among the diseases caused by asbestos are
asbestosis," mesothelioma,' 2 bronchogenic carcinoma,' 3 and possibly
other "asbestos-related" medical complications.' 4 The diseases caused
by asbestos have not been limited to asbestos workers. Often their families, exposed to the dust through the worker's clothing, have been affected with the same diseases." One significant aspect of the medical
problem "is that it takes 20 years or more for some asbestos-related
diseases to appear."' 16
III.

THE LEGAL PROBLEMS

This comment will examine five issues connected with the asbestos
problem. The issues involve the statute of limitations, manufacturer liability, insurer liability, use of bankruptcy laws as a defense to claims of
liability, and the possible need for federal legislation to deal with the
asbestos problem.
A.

Statute of Limitations

Complying with statutes of limitation often poses special problems
for a plaintiff seeking compensation for asbestos-related disease.
"[B]ecause the disease is 'latent,' or slowly progressive, the plaintiff's
health has remained unaffected until long after the exposure, and he
has become aware of the injury only recently.""
The courts, upon examination of this unique problem, have employed three distinct rules to determine when the statutes begin to run.
These rules are necessary because courts "have been troubled by the
difficulty of identifying the time of accrual in personal injury cases. ' ' 8
Under the traditional view, the statute of limitations begins run10. Comment, Asbestos Litigation. supra note 5, at 74-77.
11. DORLAND'S, supra note 8, at 152 defines "asbestosis" as "a form of lung disease (pneumoconiosis) caused by inhaling fibers of asbestos; called also amianthosis."
12. Id. at 942 defines "mesothelioma" as "a tumor developed from mesothelial tissue."
13. Id. at 261 defines "bronchogenic carcinoma" as "carcinoma of the lung .. " The term
"carcinoma" is defined as "a malignant new growth made up of epithelial cells tending to infiltrate the surrounding tissues and give rise to metastases." Id.
14. Mehaffy, supra note 7, at 345. "There are other diseases which some would classify as
'asbestos-related.' These include cancer of the gastrointestinal tract and other diseases. However,
as I have mentioned, the medical research in these areas has not progressed to the point where any
meaningful conclusions can be drawn." Id.
15. Id. at 350-51.
16. Hertzberg, supra note 2, at 1, col. 6.
17. Note, Preserving Causes of Action in Latent Disease Cases: The Locke v. JohnsManville Corp. Date-of-the-Injury Accrual Rule, 68 VA. L. REv. 615 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Preserving Causes of Action].
18. Id. at 619-20.
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ning at the time the plaintiff is exposed to the harmful substance. 19 The
problem with this approach, when applied to cases involving a "latent"

disease or injury, is that it often leads to harsh results. Because it may
take years for asbestos-related diseases to manifest themselves, the statute of limitations may have already run before the potential plaintiff
even realizes he has been injured. As a result, the injured party may
not be afforded an opportunity to seek redress from the manufacturer

or other parties responsible for his medical condition. It becomes hard
to reconcile this result when contemplating the public policy behind the

statute of limitations for tort actions. 0

Some courts, realizing the harsh results brought on by the traditional approach, have adopted the "discovery rule."" Under the "discovery rule," the plaintiff is allowed relief even when the injury has
taken a long period of time to develop. Once the injured party discovers

his injury, or through reasonable care should have discovered it, the
statute of limitations begins to run.22
Some courts which might otherwise have adopted the "discovery
rule" have been dissuaded from doing so because of their belief that
they must defer to the state legislature. In other words, any change

from a traditional approach to a "discovery" type view must be the
product of legislative action rather than judicial action.
When the Supreme Court of Virginia faced such a situation in
Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp.,2 4 it did not apply either the traditional

19. Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d
244 (1981).
20. See Note, Preserving Causes of Action, supra note 17, at 618-19.
Courts and commentators have identified several policies behind statutes of limitations. First, these statutes provide repose for potential defendants by relieving them from
the risk of liability for acts that occurred in the distant past. It is thought to be unfair to
compel a person to defend himself against a claim he reasonably had assumed was forgotten. Repose also allows a potential defendant to plan for the future without fear that his
activities will be disrupted by a lawsuit. Second, statutes of limitations eliminate many of
the evidentiary problems that can interfere with the just resolution of stale claims, such as
the unavailability of witnesses or evidence and the deterioration of memories over time.
Finally, the statutes require those genuinely wishing to protect their legal rights to bring
their actions quickly, thus limiting the potential for misuse of the legal system by plaintiffs
asserting fraudulent claims or bringing actions merely to harass defendants.
Id. at 619 (footnote omitted).
21. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (silicosis); Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 684 F.2d I ll (D.C. Cir. 1982) (asbestosis); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523
F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) (asbestosis); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th
Cir. 1973) (asbestosis and mesothelioma), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Louisville Trust Co.
v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979) (mesothelioma); Haig v. JohnsManville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 (1978) (mesothelioma).
22. See Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d Ill (D.C. Cir. 1982).
23. Note, Preserving Causes of Action, supra note 17, at 626.
24. 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981).
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approach or the "discovery rule." Instead, under a statute of limitations

which began running when a plaintiff was injured, the court decided
that medical evidence will determine when the injury occurs. This
could be anytime from the exposure to asbestos through the time the

asbestos-related disease is discovered.2 1 In other words, it will be a
medical determination which pinpoints the date of the injury. This
means medical evidence will also determine when the statute of limitations begins to run. "This approach differs significantly from both the
traditional rule that injury occurs upon the initial harmful contact and
the more modern rule that discovery of the injury starts the statutory
period."2
Although the Virginia "date-of-injury" approach appears to be a
valid alternative to the two prevailing views, it has been attacked as
"inequitable, expensive, confusing, and of little help to plaintiffs. 2 7
The criticism apparently stems from the view that not as many plaintiffs will be helped by the approach as under the "discovery rule," and
that it would be unfair to treat two plaintiffs differently if one developed "a sudden injury and the other's injury was latent for a long period." 2 8 Further, because of the broad interpretation of the word "injury" in the Locke decision, the statute would probably begin to run at
an early point in time in many latent disease type cases anyway, thus
denying relief to many potential plaintiffs. 2 '
In view of the dangerous propensity of asbestos, and the fact that
most workers only became aware of the hazard long after they were
exposed, 80 the adoption of the "discovery rule" seems to make the most
32
legal sense." The statute of limitations serves a valid public purpose.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Note, Preserving Causes of Action, supra note 17, at 615.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 629.
Id.

29. Id. at 630.
30.

Comment, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 5, at 56.
Not only did industry ignore available medical literature concerning the harmful effects of asbestos exposure on their employees, but they completely neglected to consider the
effect asbestos products would have on workers and members of the general public: lung
disease and cancer. Yet labels on asbestos products never gave warning of the most significant dangers (asbestosis and cancer) even after the industry learned of the medical hazards
associated with asbestos exposure. As a result, the general public as well as asbestos workers and their families have been unnecessarily exposed to asbestos dust.
Id. at 55-56 (footnotes omitted).
31. The "discovery rule" has been applied in other "latent" type cases. For example, oral
contraceptive ingestion can produce injuries, which like asbestos, may take a long period of time
to manifest themselves. See McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980).
Other jurisdictions which have applied some form of the "discovery rule" in varying contexts
are Mayer v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 14 Ariz. App. 248, 482 P.2d 497 (1971); Enfield v. Hunt, 91
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It prevents the potential plaintiff from "sleeping on his rights" and asserting "stale" and perhaps fraudulent claims against a defendant who
has, along with any witnesses, long since forgotten about the particulars involved. The "discovery rule" properly serves the policies underlying the statutes. Once the plaintiff "discovers" his injury or disease the
statutory period begins to run. If he lets the period lapse, he will be
barred from bringing suit. The rule, however, prevents the potential
unfairness which is inherent in every latent disease type situation because it recognizes the common sense notion that if one does not realize
that he is injured, he is not going to bring a tort action for his injury.
Therefore, the "discovery rule" protects the interests of both parties.
Courts and legislatures alike should recognize the uniqueness of the
asbestos tragedy and fashion law to provide for the injured, not deny
them relief where there is no overriding public purpose to be served.
B.

Manufacturer Liability

Provided the injured workers get by the particular statute of limitations requirement in their jurisdiction, they may still face the problem of determining which asbestos manufacturer is responsible for their
injury. Many workers during the course of their careers came into contact with asbestos products produced by several manufacturers. In
many cases it becomes impossible to determine one company's liability
3
over another.
In Borel v. FibreboardPaperProducts Corp.," the court foresaw
the difficulty in determining which manufacturer was actually responsible for the plaintiff's injury. The plaintiff complained that he had developed mesothelioma and asbestosis during a long period of exposure
to asbestos. Arguing that asbestos was "unreasonably dangerous," 85 the
plaintiff sued general manufacturers of asbestos who he claimed were
responsible for his medical condition. He claimed that he was not
aware of any dangers involved with asbestos exposure and that he was
not warned of any dangers by the manufacturers who had a duty to do
so. The jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the theory of strict lia-

Cal. App. 3d 417, 154 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1979); Nolen v. Sarasohn, 379 So. 2d 161 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980); Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 50 Hawaii 150, 433 P.2d 220 (1967); Teller v. Schepens, Mass. -, 411 N.E.2d 464 (1980); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980);
Silverman v. Lathrop, 168 N.J. Super. 333, 403 A.2d 18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 243 A.2d 745 (1968); Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 453
P.2d 631 (1969); and Harrison v. Seltzer, 268 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1980).
32. See supra note 20.
33. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
34. Id.

35. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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bility was affirmed by the reviewing court.3 6 The Borel court decided
that all involved manufacturers should be "jointly and severally
liable.""7
The Borel decision appears to be the correct result in cases where
no one manufacturer can be singled out for liability. It allows the injured plaintiff to recover in an otherwise difficult proof situation.
In Borel it was decided that the manufacturers knew or should

have known of the dangers asbestos posed to workers.3 8 As a result,
some commentators have urged that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
"be used to preclude the defendants from relitigating the issue of medical knowledge, because the defendants in the majority of asbestos cases
have litigated their knowledge and lost."3 9 For courts already
overburdened with asbestos-related cases, proper use of collateral estoppel to prevent relitigation of issues previously decided makes good judicial sense. In the majority of cases, time and money would certainly be
saved.
C. Insurer Liability

Once it has been determined that a manufacturer is liable for asbestos-related injuries, the next step is to analyze its insurance coverage. The legal issue concerning insurer liability is "whether an insurer's
liability starts when workers were first exposed to asbestos or begins
only when the disease manifests itself years later."40 Complicating this
issue is the fact that many asbestos manufacturers were insured by several insurance companies over the liability period. Because of the vast
numbers of asbestos-related lawsuits and the countless dollars at stake,
it is a very important question for insurance companies.
Whether one or many insurers are involved, the "standard policy
language" must be construed.4 "The significance of this standard policy language is that it sets forth both the trigger of coverage, i.e., the
event that requires an insurance policy to provide coverage for a claim,
and the extent of an insurance company's obligations under a triggered
policy." 42
Regarding the "triggering" of an insurance policy, the courts have
accepted three theories: (a) exposure, (b) manifestation, and (c) a the-

36. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1081.
37. Id. at 1096.
38. Id. at 1089.
39. Comment, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 5, at 86-87.
40. Hertzberg, supra note 2, at 1, col. 6.
41. Oshinsky, Comprehensive General Liability Insurance: Trigger and Scope of Coverage
In Long-Term Exposure Cases, 17 FORUM 1035, 1037 (1982).
42. Id. at 1037.
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ory which encompasses both exposure and manifestation and everything in between."
Courts which have adopted the "exposure theory"" state that an
insurer's liability is triggered when the worker first becomes exposed to
the asbestos fibers. Some theorists have suggested that the "exposure
theory" can be broken down into "inhalation exposure" and "exposure
in residence."' 5 Variations aside, the "exposure theory" deems that the
triggering "injury" under the policy occurs when the worker is exposed
to the asbestos dust. 6 "The 'exposure' theory hooks all insurers that
covered the company over the years. 1 7 It has been suggested that the
"companies generally favor the exposure theory because it provides a
larger pool of insurers to reduce the companies' own settlement outlays
48
beyond their coverage limits.'
Courts advancing the "manifestation theory" argue that no "injury" under the policy has occurred until "it becomes reasonably capable of medical diagnosis."' 9 Manifestation theorists argue that mere exposure to asbestos dust does not constitute the requisite injury"
necessary to trigger coverage. 50 It is only after the "manifestation of
either asbestosis, mesothelioma or lung cancer" that a policy is triggered.5 1 As a result, insurers who covered the asbestos manufacturer
before any manifestation would not be held liable even though the exposure to the asbestos had occurred while they were the insurer.5
There are problems with both the "exposure" and "manifestation"
theories. The case of Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America5"
outlined the problems and proposed a solution of its own. The Keene
court felt that the "reasonable expectations" of the insured5 ' needed to
be considered. It determined that if exposure alone was used as a trigger for liability, the resulting disease "would be characterized best as a

43. Id.
44. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1980), affd on rehearing, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
45. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 1644 (1982). "Inhalation exposure" is determined to be at the time the worker is first
exposed to the asbestos dust while "exposure in residence" means the further amplification of the
disease within the body. Id. at 1042.
46. Id.
47. Hertzberg, supra note 2, at 1, col. 6.
48. Id.
49. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 25 (lst Cir. 1982).
50. Keene Corp., 667 F.2d at 1043.
51. Id.
52. Hertzberg, supra note 2, at 1, col. 6.
53. Keene Corp., 667 F.2d 1034.
54. Id. at 1044.
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consequence of the injury. ' 5 Thus, any further development of the disease would not be considered a new injury and, as a result, there would
not be any further liability triggered. 6 Barring indications to the contrary, this would not establish "a purchase of certainty with respect to
liability for asbestos-related diseases. '5 7 For if the exposure had occurred before the manufacturer had obtained coverage, the manufacturer would be held liable instead of the insurance company when the
later manifestation took place. This prompted the Keene court to find
manifestation as "one trigger of coverage" because "any other result
would violate very reasonable expectations" of the manufacturer. 8 But
the court went on to hold that manifestation was not the sole trigger of
coverage,5 9 stating,
"

[i]
f that interpretation were adopted .

[the manufacturer] would not

be covered for diseases manifesting themselves after 1976. By that time,
it was widely known that prolonged inhalation of asbestos has a high
probability of causing disease. From about then on, insurance companies
ceased issuing policies that adequately cover asbestos-related disease.
Yet we can still expect thousands of cases of those diseases to manifest
themselves throughout the rest of the century. If we were to hold that
only the manifestation of disease can trigger coverage, the insurance
companies would have to bear only a fraction of [the manufacturer's]
total liability for asbestos-related disease.60
The court went on to conclude:
In sum, the allocation of rights and obligations established by the insurance policies, would be undermined if either the exposure to asbestos or
the manifestation of asbestos-related disease were the sole trigger of coverage. We conclude, therefore, that inhalation exposure, exposure in residence, and manifestation all trigger coverage under the policies. We interpret "bodily injury" to mean any part of the single injurious process
that asbestos-related diseases entail. 61
The Keene court next "consider[ed] the extent to which an insurer
is liable to its policyholder once coverage under its policy is triggered.16 2 The result was that "each insurance company whose policy is
triggered is liable in full for the policyholder's legal liability, except
that each such insurance company may seek contribution from the

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1045-46 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1047.
Id.
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other insurance companies whose policies also have been triggered.""
It has been suggested that "factual differences among" the insurance company liability cases explain the diverse stances taken by the
jurisdictions.4 It appears more likely, however, that the various theories adopted by the courts are merely their way of dealing with an imc
portant and complex issue that has arisen too quickly on the legal
scene.
D.

Use of Bankruptcy Laws

In the summer of 1982, as thousands of damage suits relating to
asbestos began to clog the nation's courts, 5 Johns-Manville Corporation, a company which mines and manufactures asbestos materials,
filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.56
Johns-Manville had become financially burdened under the weight of
many of the asbestos-related lawsuits.
Critics have questioned the ethics and legality of the company's
bankruptcy petition. It has been reported that the company was not
insolvent when it filed its petition. Although the company claimed the
legal move was necessary to insure payment to its creditors, others have
felt that the company was trying to "squeeze through a legal loophole"
1
to avoid facing the many pending and potential lawsuits against it. 7
Although the health of the injured asbestos workers must remain the
top priority and concern in any discussion of asbestos-related problems,
one must also consider the "health" of American industry. It is a sad
commentary on our times when a major industry must file for bankruptcy to protect itself from legal attack. The issue, as of now undecided, bears close scrutiny.
E.

Need For Reform

As this comment has attempted to show, asbestos has brought suffering and hardship to this nation's people and institutions. Asbestos
workers and members of their families have taken ill and died. Claims
against manufacturers have brought possible financial crisis to the asbestos industry and to the insurance industry involved with it.6"
Throughout the country, thousands of lawsuits have tied up the courts
with complex questions of law. Because so many people in this country
were exposed to dangerous amounts of asbestos, and because the inju63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Oshinsky, supra note 41, at 1036.
Id. at 1045.
Hertzberg, supra note 2, at 1, col. 6.
ABC News, supra note 1.
Id.
Hertzberg, supra note 2, at 16, col. 1.
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ries that evolve are latent in nature, the massive problems will continue
for many years to come.
It is this realization that the asbestos problems will increase that
suggests the need for some type of reform. It has been written that
'ihere need be "some sort of federal compensation law covering asbestos-related diseases" along the lines of "the Black Lung legislation.""'
The asbestos problem is unique and dangerous. It is a burden on people
and institutions that needs to be dealt with swiftly. Federal legislation
is certainly a viable way to deal with the health and financial concerns
asbestos poses, but in an age of federal budget cutbacks it seems highly
unlikely that such legislation will be passed.
One commentator has concluded:
The question is simply who shall pay for the loss and how this can best
be determined. Under the present system, we put the burden upon a few
insurance companies who happened to insure insulation manufacturers
years ago, at a time when the catastrophic results of the use of the product insured were clearly beyond the contemplation of the underwriters,
even though the courts have charged the insureds with constructive
knowledge of the hazard. Further, we determine the liability through the
application of rules of law never designed for such a situation, and, because of the magnitude of the litigation, we compromise the body of our
law by judicial legislation motivated not by any sense of fairness or justice, but by desire to 'clean up the docket.' All we have succeeded in
doing, thus far, is to continue with our inefficient and frequently inequitable system, and in the process clog our courts to the point where
judges
70
are writing bad law simply in order to reduce the case load.
IV.

CONCLUSION

"At least 8,500 workers-and perhaps as many as 10,000-will die

69. Mehaffy, supra note 7, at 351. See The Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-02, 921-24, 931-34, 936-40, 951
(1976)). The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (codified
as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-04, 921-24a, 931-33, 937, 940-45 (Supp. IV 1980)). These statutes have been subjects of much legal commentary. See, e.g., Lapp, A Lawyer's Medical Guide to
Black Lung Litigation, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 721 (1981). The need for reform has not been overlooked by some members of the Houses of Congress in Washington, D.C. See Wilson v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 112 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Responding, inter alia, to the estimate that 1.6 million workers will die from an asbestosrelated disease, see 127 Cong. Rec. S10033 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981) (statement of Sen.
Hart), members of both Houses of Congress have introduced bills which would provide a
comprehensive, nationwide compensation scheme covering workers who die or are disabled
or injured as a result of asbestos exposure. H.R. 5735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S.
1643, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Both bills currently await committee action.

Id.
70.

Mehaffy, supra note 7, at 352.
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each year until the end of the century from asbestos-related cancers.""
The asbestos tragedy is a problem with grave consequences. As the
public becomes more aware of the seriousness of the situation, it will
become less tolerant with the way "relief" is dispensed in the various
jurisdictions. Theories regarding statutes of limitations and insurer liability are proper if they bring on efficiency and fairness. As the cases
indicate, this has not always been true.
The time has come for national action. Legislation is needed to
insure that those unfortunate people who have been exposed to asbestos, and are now dying as a result, will not be prevented from seeking
the relief they deserve simply because the statute of limitations has run
or because they are unable to prove which manufacturer produced the
asbestos which injured them. It should also be the goal of such legislation to protect the corporations and insurance companies involved from
financial ruin. Without such legislation, more corporations might be
forced to turn to measures such as bankruptcy to solve their legal
problems.
The asbestos problem is serious enough to justify a solution other
than piecemeal stop-gap measures. Perhaps an enlightened public will
demand federal action when they determine that "[t]here ought to be a
7
better way."
Robert P. Glass

71.
72.

Hertzberg, supra note 2, at 1, col. 6.
Mehaffy, supra note 7, at 352.
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